This study develops a Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous entry of heterogeneous …rms to analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy on economic growth via a cash-in-advance constraint on R&D investment. Our results can be summarized as follows. In the special case of a zero entry cost, an increase in the nominal interest rate decreases R&D, the arrival rate of innovations and economic growth as in previous studies. However, in the general case of a positive entry cost, an increase in the nominal interest rate a¤ects the distribution of innovations that are implemented and would have an inverted-U e¤ect on economic growth if the entry cost is su¢ciently large. We also calibrate the model to aggregate data of the US economy and …nd that the growth-maximizing in ‡ation rate is about 3%, which is consistent with recent empirical estimates.
Introduction
This study develops a Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous entry of heterogeneous …rms to analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy on economic growth. The canonical Schumpeterian growth model in seminal studies such as Segerstrom et al. (1990) , Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) features an identical step size of quality improvements across …rms. In this study, we consider a Schumpeterian model with random quality improvements as in Minniti et al. (2013) but with the addition of a …xed entry cost to generate endogenous entry of …rms with heterogeneous step sizes of quality improvements. To incorporate money demand into this growth-theoretic framework, we impose a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint on R&D investment. Berentsen et al. (2012) , Chu and Cozzi (2014) and Chu et al. (2015) provide extensive discussion on evidence for the presence of cash requirements on R&D expenditures. 1 We capture these cash requirements using a CIA constraint on R&D.
In this monetary growth-theoretic framework, we derive the following results. In the special case of a zero entry cost, an increase in the nominal interest rate decreases R&D, the arrival rate of innovations and economic growth as in previous studies, such as Chu and Cozzi (2014) who consider a monetary Schumpeterian growth model with an identical step size of quality improvements, because the distribution of innovations that are implemented is exogenous under a zero entry cost despite random quality improvements. However, in the general case of a positive entry cost, monetary policy a¤ects the distribution of innovations that are implemented. Speci…cally, an increase in the nominal interest rate decreases R&D and the arrival rate of innovations, which increases the present value of future pro…ts. The resulting higher value of inventions leads to a lower threshold of quality improvements above which an innovation is implemented generating a positive e¤ect on economic growth due to more entries. Together with the negative e¤ect on the arrival rate of innovations, an increase in the nominal interest rate would have an inverted-U e¤ect on economic growth if the entry cost is su¢ciently large. Because the Fisher equation gives rise to a positive longrun relationship between the nominal interest rate and the in ‡ation rate that is supported by empirical studies such as Mishkin (1992) and Booth and Ciner (2001) , our result also implies an inverted-U relationship between in ‡ation and economic growth. This theoretical prediction on an inverted-U relationship between in ‡ation and economic growth is supported by empirical studies such as Bick (2010) and López-Villavicencio and Mignon (2011). Finally, we calibrate the model to aggregate data of the US economy to provide a quantitative analysis and …nd that the growth-maximizing in ‡ation rate is 2.9%, which is close to the empirical estimate in López-Villavicencio and Mignon (2011) who identify a threshold in ‡ation rate of 2.7% for industrialized countries. 1 For example, early empirical studies such as Hall (1992) and Opler et al. (1999) …nd a positive and signi…cant relationship between R&D and cash ‡ows in US …rms. More recently, Bates et al. (2009) document that the average cash-to-assets ratio in US …rms increased substantially from 1980 to 2006 and argue that this is partly driven by their rising R&D expenditures. Brown and Petersen (2011) provide evidence that …rms smooth R&D expenditures by maintaining a bu¤er stock of liquidity in the form of cash reserves. Falato and Sim (2014) use …rm-level data in the US to show that …rms' cash holdings increase (decrease) signi…cantly in response to a rise (cut) in R&D tax credits. These results suggest that due to …nancial frictions, …rms need to use cash to …nance their R&D investment.
This study relates to the literature on innovation and economic growth. The R&Dbased growth model originates from Romer (1990) , who develops a variety-expanding growth model in which economic growth is driven by the development of new products. Then, Segerstrom et al. (1990) , Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) develop the Schumpeterian quality-ladder growth model in which economic growth is driven by the quality improvement of existing products. For simplicity, these studies assume an identical step size for all quality improvements. A recent study by Minniti et al. (2013) generalizes the Schumpeterian model by allowing for heterogeneous step sizes of quality improvements that are randomly drawn from a distribution. Our study extends the elegant framework of Minniti et al. (2013) by introducing a …xed entry cost of implementing a developed invention in order to generate endogenous entries of heterogeneous …rms, 2 which turn out to have important implications on the e¤ects of monetary policy.
This study also relates to the literature on in ‡ation and innovation. In this literature, Marquis and Re¤ett (1994) is the seminal study that analyzes the e¤ects of in ‡ation on innovation in the Romer variety-expanding growth model. In contrast, we analyze the e¤ects of in ‡ation in a Schumpeterian quality-ladder model as in Chu and Lai (2013) , Chu and Cozzi (2014) , Chu et al. (2015) and He and Zou (2016) , whose models however feature an identical step size of quality improvements across …rms. Subsequent studies, such as Chu and Ji (2016) and Huang et al. (2015) , consider monetary policy in a Schumpeterian growth model with both variety expansion and (identical) quality accumulation across …rms. As in Marquis and Re¤ett (1994) , these studies predict a monotonic relationship between in ‡ation and economic growth. 3 The present study contributes to this literature by allowing for the endogenous entry of …rms with heterogeneous step sizes of quality improvements, which gives rise to a novel channel through which monetary policy a¤ects innovation and growth. As a result, the model generates an inverted-U relationship between in ‡ation and economic growth, which is supported by recent empirical studies.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents and solves the model. Section 3 analyzes the e¤ects of monetary policy. The …nal section concludes.
A Schumpeterian model with heterogeneous …rms
The Schumpeterian quality-ladder growth model is based on Grossman and Helpman (1991) . We extend their model by (a) introducing money demand via a CIA constraint on R&D to analyze monetary policy, (b) considering lab-equipment innovation and entry processes that use …nal goods (instead of labor) as the input, (c) allowing for random quality improvements as in Minniti et al. (2013) , and (d) incorporating a …xed entry cost to generate endogenous entry of heterogeneous …rms as in Melitz (2003) . In summary, when a …rm invents a higher quality product, the step size of the quality increment is randomly drawn from a Pareto distribution. If and only if the quality increment is su¢ciently large, then the …rm would pay the …xed entry cost to implement the invention and enter the market.
Household
In the economy, there is a representative household which has the following lifetime utility function:
where the parameter > 0 is the subjective discount rate and c t denotes consumption of …nal goods (numeraire) at time t. The household maximizes utility subject to an assetaccumulation equation (expressed in real terms) given by
a t is the real value of …nancial assets (in the form of equity shares in monopolistic intermediate goods …rms) owned by the household. r t is the real interest rate. t is the in ‡ation rate. m t is the real money balance accumulated by the household. b t is the amount of money borrowed by R&D entrepreneurs subject to the following constraint: b t m t . i t is the interest rate on money b t borrowed by R&D entrepreneurs, and it can be shown as a no-arbitrage condition that i t must be equal to the nominal interest rate such that i t = r t + t from the Fisher equation. To earn the wage rate w t , the household inelastically supplies one unit of labor. 4
t is a lump-sum transfer from the government to the household. From standard dynamic optimization, the familiar Euler equation is
Final goods
Final goods are produced by perfectly competitive …rms that employ labor and a composite of intermediate goods as inputs. The production function of …nal goods is Y t = L t K 1 t , where L t = 1 is labor input. K t is a composite of intermediate goods produced with the following Cobb-Douglas aggregator:
where the integer j in q t (!; j) denotes the quality vintage of intermediate goods !. Let j ! denotes the highest-quality vintage in industry !. Firms are indi¤erent between the highestquality vintage and the second-highest-quality vintage if their relative price is
where t (!) > 1 is the quality increment between the two consecutive vintages of intermediate goods ! at time t. As usual, whenever this equality holds, we focus on the case in which …rms buy the highest-quality intermediate goods only. In equilibrium, only the highest quality intermediate goods are traded. From pro…t maximization, the conditional demand function for intermediate goods ! 2 [0; 1] is given by
Multiplying q t (!; j ! ) to both sides of (6) and then aggregating the natural log of the resulting equation with respect to !, we derive
where
denote respectively the aggregate quality index and the aggregate price index of intermediate goods.
Intermediate goods
There is a unit continuum of industries ! 2 [0; 1] producing di¤erentiated intermediate goods. Each industry is temporarily dominated by a quality leader until the arrival and implementation of the next higher-quality product. The owner of the new innovation becomes the next quality leader. 5 The current quality leader in industry ! uses one unit of …nal goods to produce one unit of intermediate goods y t (!; j ! ), so that the marginal cost of production is one. From Bertrand competition, 6 limit pricing yields the equilibrium price given by
Therefore, the amount of monopolistic pro…t in industry ! is
where the second equality uses (6) and (8).
R&D
R&D is performed by a continuum of competitive entrepreneurs. If an R&D entrepreneur employs R t (!) units of …nal goods to engage in innovation in industry !, then she is successful in inventing the next higher-quality product in the industry with an instantaneous probability given by
inversely measures R&D productivity and is proportional to Q (1 )= t to ensure balanced growth. To facilitate the payment of R t (!), the entrepreneur needs to borrow cash from the household, and the cost of borrowing is determined by the nominal interest rate i t . Therefore, the cost of R&D is
Let v e t (!; j ! + 1) denotes the expected value of an innovation before the realization of its quality increment. Then, the R&D free-entry condition is given by
Random quality improvements
As in Minniti et al. (2013) , when an R&D entrepreneur invents a higher-quality product in industry !, the quality increment t (!) > 1 is drawn from a stationary Pareto distribution with the following probability density function:
where the parameter 2 (0; 1) determines the shape of the Pareto distribution. Given that the expected value of t (!) is equal across industries, (9) implies that the expected value of t (!; j ! ) is also the same across industries. Therefore, we will follow the standard treatment in the literature to focus on the symmetric equilibrium in which the arrival rate of innovations is equal across industries, 7 such that t (!) = t for ! 2 [0; 1].
Endogenous …rm entry
To generate an endogenous distribution of heterogeneous …rms, we follow Melitz (2003) and others to consider a …xed entry cost. The entry cost is given by t Q 8 which is proportional to Q (1 )= t to ensure balanced growth. Given the entry cost, a …rm enters the market if and only if v t ( ) t , where v t ( ) denotes the ex post value of an innovation (i.e., after the realization of the quality increment ). 9 
is stationary in equilibrium, it can be shown that there exists a stationary threshold value of , 10 denoted as~ , above which …rms implement their innovations and enter the market generating endogenous entry of …rms with heterogeneous quality improvements. 7 Cozzi et al. (2007) provide a theoretical justi…cation for the symmetric equilibrium to be the unique rational-expectation equilibrium in the Schumpeterian model. 8 We do not impose a CIA constraint on entry for the following reasons. Unlike R&D investment that is subject to uncertainty in innovation success, the entry cost is incurred after an innovation is already developed and patented. Therefore, banks should be available to extend credits to the …rm, which can use the patent as a collateral. 9 In a symmetric equilibrium with t (!) = t , the value of innovations does not depend on !. 10 See Appendix A for the proof.
Asset prices
The ex-ante value of an innovation (i.e., before the realization of ) is formally de…ned as v e t (!; j ! + 1) =
where Pr( ~ ) denotes the probability of the innovation being implementable. In the symmetric equilibrium with v e t (!; j ! + 1) v e t , the no-arbitrage condition for the ex-ante value of innovation can be derived as 11
where t is the arrival rate of innovation. Pr( ~ ) t is the instantaneous probability that an innovation is created and implemented in an industry. The Pareto probability density function implies that
Substituting (14) into (13) and rearranging terms yield
where the ex-ante value of monopolistic pro…ts can be shown to be
Similarly, the no-arbitrage condition for the ex-post value of an innovation with ~ is
where the ex-post value of monopolistic pro…ts with ~ is given by
Monetary authority
The monetary policy instrument that we consider is the nominal interest rate i t , which is exogenously set by the monetary authority. Given i t , the in ‡ation rate t is endogenously determined according to the Fisher equation such that t = i t r t , where r t is the real interest rate and determined from the Euler equation in (3) . Then, the growth rate of the nominal money supply is given by t = t + _ m t =m t , which becomes = i on the balanced growth path. 12 Finally, the monetary authority returns the seigniorage revenue as a lump-sum transfer t = _ m t + t m t to the household.
Dynamics
In this section, we characterize the dynamics of the model. Lemma 1 shows that given a constant nominal interest rate i, the economy immediately jumps to a balanced growth path. On this balanced growth path, each variable grows a constant (possibly zero) growth rate.
Lemma 1
The economy jumps to a unique and saddle-point stable balanced growth path.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Economic growth
Recall that the (log of) aggregate quality index is ln Q t R 1 0 ln q t (!; j ! )d!. In industry !; the quality q t (!; j ! ) jumps to q t (!; j ! +1) = (!)q t (!; j ! ) with probability Pr( ~ ) =~
1=
. The continuum of industries shares this random process of quality improvements. Therefore, the time derivative of ln Q t is given by
Using the law of large numbers, we obtain 13
where ln~ + captures the average step size of implemented quality improvements andf ( ) is de…ned asf 12 It is useful to note that in this model, it is the growth rate of the money supply that a¤ects the real economy in the long run, and a one-time change in the level of money supply has no long-run e¤ect on the real economy. This is the well-known distinction between the neutrality and superneutrality of money. Empirical evidence generally favors neutrality and rejects superneutrality, consistent with our model; see Fisher and Seater (1993) for a discussion on the neutrality and superneutrality of money. 13 Derivations are available in an unpublished appendix; see Appendix C.
Finally, the growth rate of output Y t and consumption c t is equal to
Equation (21) shows that the equilibrium growth rate depends on two endogenous variables, the arrival rate of innovations and the threshold step size~ . We can determine using the R&D condition v e t = (1 + i) Q
where the balanced-growth value of v e t is given by v e t = e t =( +~ 1= ) ~ 1= Q (1 )= t using (15) and the Euler equation. Then, substituting (16) into the R&D condition, we obtain (1 )
).
In Appendix B, we show that the production function of …nal goods can be expressed as
Similarly, we can determine~ using the entry condition v t (~ ) = Q
) using (17) and the Euler equation. Then, substituting (18) into the entry condition, we obtain
Combining (22) and (24), we have the~ condition given by
where the left-hand side is monotonically increasing in~ . Therefore, (25) implicitly determines the unique equilibrium value of~ . Using (23)- (25) , we obtain the condition given by
Given the equilibrium value of~ from (25) , (26) determines the unique equilibrium value of .
Monetary policy and economic growth
In this section, we explore the e¤ects of monetary policy on economic growth. In Section 3.1, we analytically derive the e¤ects of the nominal interest rate. In Section 3.2, we calibrate the model to quantify the relationship between in ‡ation and economic growth.
Qualitative analysis
Here we …rst derive the e¤ects of increasing the nominal interest rate i on the innovationarrival rate and the threshold step size~ . Lemma 2 shows that is decreasing in i for a given~ . Lemma 3 shows that~ is decreasing in i. The intuition can be explained as follows. An increase in the nominal interest rate i increases the cost of R&D and reduces the incentives for innovation; as a result, the innovation rate decreases for a given~ . From the balanced-growth version of (15), we have v e t = e t =( +~
, which shows that the decrease in , by reducing creative destruction, increases the present value of the pro…t stream generated by implementing an innovation. This induces the implementation of innovations associated with smaller pro…t margins, thereby reducing the threshold mark-up for entry.
Lemma 2 For a given~ , the innovation rate is decreasing in the nominal interest rate i.
Proof. Use (26) .
Lemma 3
The threshold step size~ is decreasing in the nominal interest rate i.
Proof. Use (25) .
When the entry cost t is zero, the nominal interest rate has no e¤ect on the distribution of innovations that are implemented because all …rms enter the market regardless of the size of quality increments. In this case,~ = 1, and g = 1 is monotonically decreasing in i via . This result is the same as in Chu and Cozzi (2014) , who consider a Schumpeterian growth model with an identical step size of quality improvements across …rms. However, when the entry cost t is positive, the nominal interest rate i a¤ects both~ and . In this case, Pr( ~ ) =~ 1= is increasing in i. In other words, an increase in the nominal interest rate reduces the threshold value~ for entry and leads to more innovations being implemented for a given . When the entry cost t is su¢ciently large, the overall e¤ects of i on the composite innovation rate~ 1= and the equilibrium growth rate g = 1 (ln~ + )~ 1= become nonmonotonic. Speci…cally, we …nd that when the nominal interest rate i increases,~ 1= and g …rst increase and eventually decrease. We summarize these results in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 If the entry cost is su¢ciently large (small), an increase in the nominal interest rate has an inverted-U (negative) e¤ect on the composite innovation rate~ Before we conclude this section, we explore the relationship between in ‡ation and economic growth. The Fisher equation gives rise to a positive long-run relationship between the in ‡ation rate and the nominal interest rate that is supported by empirical studies such as Mishkin (1992) and Booth and Ciner (2001) . In our model, the in ‡ation rate is given by the Fisher equation = i r = i g(i)
, where the second equality follows from the Euler equation. Therefore, so long as @g(i)=@i < 1, we have @ =@i = 1 @g(i)=@i > 0. 14 Given this positive relationship, in ‡ation and economic growth would also exhibit an inverted-U relationship. Recent empirical studies such as Bick (2010) and López-Villavicencio and Mignon (2011) provide evidence that supports an inverted-U relationship between in ‡ation and economic growth.
Quantitative analysis
In this section, we calibrate the model to aggregate data of the US economy to provide a quantitative illustration on the e¤ects of monetary policy on economic growth. The model features the following structural parameters f ; ; ; ; g and policy variable i. For the discount rate, we set to a standard value of 0.05. For the labor share, we set to a value of 0.59; see Elsby et al. (2013) who document that the labor share in the US has fallen to less than 0.60 recently. According to the Conference Board Total Economy Database, the average growth rates of total factor productivity (TFP) in the US is about 0.6% from 1990 to 2014. We calibrate the R&D cost parameter by targeting the scenario in which domestic innovation drives half of the TFP growth in the US (i.e., g = 0:3%). 15 For the cost of entry, we calibrate by setting the time between arrivals of innovation 1= to about 3 years as in Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) . For the Pareto distribution parameter, we follow Minniti et al. (2013) to consider = 0:21 as our benchmark, but we also explore another value = 0:16 that has interesting implications. Finally, we calibrate the value of i by targeting the average in ‡ation rate in the US, which is about 2.5% in the past two decades. The parameter and variable values are summarized in Table 1 . Under our benchmark parameter values, we …nd that economic growth is an inverted-U function of the nominal interest rate. In Figures 1 and 2 , we plot the equilibrium growth rate g against the in ‡ation rate , which is monotonically increasing in the nominal interest rate i. Figure 1 presents our benchmark result and shows that the relationship between economic growth and in ‡ation follows an inverted-U shape. Furthermore, the growth-maximizing in ‡ation rate is about 2.9%, which is close to the empirical estimate in López-Villavicencio and Mignon (2011) who …nd a threshold in ‡ation rate of 2.7% for industrialized countries. In the empirical literature, studies sometime …nd a monotonically negative e¤ect of in- ‡ation on economic growth; see for example, Guerrero (2006) and Vaona (2012) . Indeed, we …nd that our model is ‡exible enough to deliver a negative relationship between in ‡ation and economic growth under reasonable parameter values. When we decrease the value of to 0.16 and recalibrate the rest of the parameters, we …nd that the relationship between economic growth and in ‡ation becomes monotonically negative. In this case, the smaller value of implies a smaller ratio of = , such that the negative e¤ect of in ‡ation dominates the positive e¤ect. 
Conclusion
In this study, we have developed a monetary Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous entry of …rms with heterogeneous quality improvements. Given this monetary growththeoretic framework, we explore the e¤ects of monetary policy on economic growth and …nd that in ‡ation could have an inverted-U e¤ect on economic growth. Furthermore, we calibrate the model to aggregate data of the US economy to provide a quantitative investigation. Under our benchmark parameter values, we …nd that the growth-maximizing in ‡ation rate is about 2.9%, which is consistent with recent empirical estimates. However, given that we have a stylized model, the quantitative analysis should be viewed as an illustrative exercise.
Meanwhile, the ex-post no-arbitrage condition for the threshold quality ( =~ t ) can be written as
By the R&D condition (11) , the entry condition v t (~ t ) = t , t = Q
(1 )= t and t = Q (1 )= t , (A7) and (A8) imply e t
Given (16) and (18), (A9) can be rearranged as
Equation (A10) shows that~ t is always stationary. 
wheref ( ) is de…ned asf
Here we introduce a modi…ed density functionf ( ) in summing on [~ ; 1] because the distribution of in equilibrium is not on the original domain [1; 1), but instead on [~ ; 1), due to endogenous entry. Note that R 1 f ( )d = 1. By (7) and (B1), we obtain
noting L t = 1. Recall that …nal goods are used for consumption, production of intermediate goods, R&D and entry. Consumption is given by c t . By (6) and (8), the amount of …nal goods used for the production of intermediate goods is
Final goods for innovation and entry are given by
where t is the set of industries in which innovations take place and are implemented at date t. Finally, we substitute (B3), (B4) and (B5) into the market-clearing condition Y t = c t + X m t + X r t + X e t to derive
where C t c t =Q
is a transformed variable that is stationary. We substitute (16) and the R&D condition (11) into (A7) to derive 16 We achieve this by applying integration by parts to
Finally, substituting (B3) and (B7) into (3) yields
noting the de…nitions C t c t =Q
. Substituting (B6) into (B8), we have an one-dimensional di¤erential equation in C t . 17 Given that t decreases with C t in (B6), the right-hand side of (B8) is increasing in C t , so the dynamics of C t is characterized by saddle-point stability, such that C t must jump to its interior steady-state value. Given a stationary value of C t , (B6) implies that t is also stationary.
Proof of Proposition 1. In this proof, we …rst show that the relationship between i and 1= is either inverted U-shaped or negative. Combining (25) and (26), we havẽ 1= =
(1 ) 1= e (1 )= ~ 1 1= ! :
(B9)
By di¤erentiating the right-hand side of (B9) with respect to~ ; we can easily show that d(~ 1= )=d~ > (<) 0 if~ < (>) 1= (1 ) , implying an inverted-U relationship betweeñ and~ 1= : In identifying the relationship with respect to i; we naturally focus on a non-trivial range of~ ; i.e., ( ; ); where~ 1= > 0 holds. 18 Given that~ monotonically decreases with i (Lemma 3), i 0 provides another natural upper bound of~ , say i ; which is de…ned by
When i is large enough (exceeding 1=(1 )), the relationship between i and~ 1= is inverted U-shaped on the non-trivial range ( ; i ); see Figure 3a . When i is small enough (falling below 1=(1 )),~ 1= is monotonically decreasing in i on ( ; i ); see Figure 3b . Note that, by (B10), i increases with and, by (B9), decreases with : This implies that for a larger (smaller) entry cost , accompanied by a larger (smaller) i ; the relationship between i and~ 1= becomes inverted-U (negative). 17 Although e is an endogenous variable, it is stationary and a function of parameters as shown in (A10). 18 The formal de…nition of ( ; ) is given by incorporating~ In the rest of this proof, we characterize the relationship between i and g. For~ < 1=(1 ); it holds d(~ 1= )=d~ > 0 as shown above. Given that (ln~ + ) is also increasing in~ ; this implies dg=d~ > 0 for~ < 1=(1 ); by noting (21) . To see the case where 1=(1 ) <~ ; using (21) Note the following properties: (a) (1=(1 )) > 0 and (1=(1 )) = 0; (b) (~ ) is an uni-modal function 19 and (~ ) is a strictly increasing function; (c) ( ) = ( ) = 0; and (d) (~ ) is strictly concave and (~ ) is strictly convex.
Using these properties, we can graphically show that (~ ) intersects (~ ) from below only once at some point in~ 2 (1=(1 ); ), below (above) which dg=d~ > (<) 0. This implies an inverted-U relation between~ and g on ( ; ). The rest of Proposition 1 straightforwardly follows, noting that i is increasing in .
